At a glance

The Broker Channel at the Bank Hearings: What Was Said vs What the Evidence Shows

House Economics Committee, Parliament House, Canberra — 12 and 13 November 2026

The numbers

71%of ANZ’s new home loans originated by brokers in FY26, up from 68%
2ANZ cases with an identified internal connection, per its CEO’s evidence
Q3of 2026–27: expected start of ASIC’s lender oversight review
3questions a provenance note answers: source, check, anomaly

Said vs shown

What was said

  • ANZ’s Nuno Matos: “the majority of fraud was coming from broker channels”.
  • Westpac’s Anthony Miller: misrepresentation “is a bit more sophisticated now with the brokers”.
  • Miller flagged a risk of brokers facilitating or colluding in fraud.

What the evidence shows

  • ANZ often could not determine whether the broker, the customer or a third party falsified the documents.
  • Brokers write 71% of ANZ’s new loans, so a volume majority is the expected result, not a rate.
  • Affected loans performed in line with the rest of the book, with no repayment deterioration.
  • No channel-rate comparison was published alongside the evidence.

Why a “majority” was always likely

ANZ new home loan originations by channel, FY26

Broker channel71%
Proprietary channel29%

How it reaches your desk

August 2026AUSTRAC publicises Operation Claw: hundreds of millions in suspected fraudulent loans. Its CEO addresses lenders, not brokers specifically.
30 September 2026ASIC supervisory letter 26-232MR lists “lending practices and broker oversight”, expected to commence Q3 2026–27.
12–13 November 2026All four major bank CEOs appear before the House Economics Committee. Two put the broker channel at the centre of their fraud answers.
NextLenders expecting review of their broker oversight tighten it. Brokers experience that as verification requests and accreditation scrutiny — not as a new rule.

The file-level response

01SOURCE
Who gave you this?Record the provider and the channel — applicant upload, employer email, referrer — with the date.

02CHECK
What did you verify?Name the check: salary credits, employer ABN, super contributions, YTD arithmetic. Not just the conclusion.

03ANOMALY
What didn’t reconcile?Record the discrepancy and how it was resolved. A chased discrepancy is evidence of diligence.

The takeaway

Most broker files prove possession of a document. A fraud reviewer asks about provenance. Recording where each document came from, what you checked and how anomalies were resolved takes a minute per file — and keeps you out of the ambiguous pile.

Compliance

ANZ’s CEO Told Parliament ‘the Majority of Fraud Was Coming From Broker Channels’. The Same Evidence Says ANZ Often Couldn’t Tell Who Falsified the Document

Two of the four major bank chiefs put the broker channel at the centre of their fraud answers in Canberra last week. Read the transcripts closely and the attribution is softer than the headline — but the operational consequence for your files is real either way.

The Broker Times15 November 2026Approx. 9 min read

A channel-share statement is not a finding of fault. But when the chief executives of two major banks make one to a parliamentary committee six weeks before ASIC opens a review into lender oversight of brokers, the practical result is the same: your files are about to be read more closely.

What was actually said

On Thursday 12 November, ANZ and Westpac appeared before the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics in Canberra, as part of the committee’s annual review of Australia’s four major banks. NAB and CBA followed on Friday 13 November. The committee is chaired by Ed Husic.

Asked about the bank’s review of suspected mortgage fraud, ANZ chief executive Nuno Matos told the committee, as reported by The Adviser:

“It’s fair to say that the majority of fraud was coming from broker channels.”

Nuno Matos, Chief Executive Officer, ANZ — House Economics Committee, 12 November 2026

He said internal involvement was minimal, describing “two cases where we spotted some connection”, with most cases involving external agents. He said advances in AI had allowed applicants to forge income documents that ANZ’s controls did not catch, and that ANZ had shared its review with regulators and with other banks.

One detail got far less attention than the quote. Matos also said that in many cases ANZ could not determine whether the broker, the customer, or someone else had falsified the documents.

The qualifier in the same answer

That qualifier is the whole story for brokers, and it is worth sitting with.

If a bank cannot establish who falsified a document, then saying the fraud “came from broker channels” describes the door the application walked through. It does not describe who did it. Those are different claims, and only the first one is supported by a review that could not identify the author of the forgery.

The denominator matters too. At ANZ’s FY26 results on 9 November, the bank reported that brokers originated 71 per cent of its new home loans, up from 68 per cent, with broker-originated loans now 63 per cent of the total book. When roughly seven in ten applications arrive through one channel, almost anything measured by volume — good files, bad files, forged payslips, repeat business — will show a broker-channel majority. A majority share of a population is not evidence of a higher rate within it.

The distinction brokers should hold onto: “most of the fraud we found entered through the broker channel” and “brokers are responsible for most of the fraud” are not the same sentence. On the evidence reported from the hearing, ANZ made the first one. No rate comparison between channels that would support the second has been published alongside the evidence.

Two further points from Matos’s evidence cut against the alarm. He said the loans in the affected group had performed in line with the rest of the book, with no deterioration in repayment behaviour. And he said ANZ sets no target mix between broker and proprietary channels and wants to grow both.

Westpac’s version

Westpac chief executive Anthony Miller, appearing the same day, framed it as a sophistication problem rather than a volume one. Misrepresentation to obtain a loan is a long-standing challenge, he said, but “it is a bit more sophisticated now with the brokers”.

Miller said brokers’ growing role in the mortgage ecosystem creates a risk of brokers facilitating or colluding in fraud, which Westpac is cautious of, while adding that borrowers themselves now have more sophisticated tools for misrepresenting income, serviceability or net wealth. On internal collusion between bank staff and outsiders, he said Westpac has it “very well controlled”.

His proposed fix is the one the industry has been circling for two years: direct access to ATO data as a “golden source of truth” for income verification. That is worth watching, because it is the one structural change that would move verification off the document and onto the record — and it would change the broker’s job as much as the bank’s.

What AUSTRAC found — and didn’t say

The hearings sit on top of Operation Claw, the Fintel Alliance exercise AUSTRAC publicised in August. It analysed data from 10 major banks and identified hundreds of millions of dollars in suspected fraudulent loans, concentrated in Sydney property. The methods AUSTRAC described were inflated incomes, misrepresented employment, fabricated or unverifiable business activity, and offshore or third-party funds used in settlements and repayments.

What AUSTRAC did not do, in its public statements as reported at the time, was pin the problem on brokers. Its chief executive, Brendan Thomas, put it to lenders:

“The scale of this activity should be a wake-up call for every lender.”

Brendan Thomas, Chief Executive Officer, AUSTRAC — August 2026

And on where the control should sit:

“The most effective way to stop mortgage fraud is before a loan is approved.”

Brendan Thomas, Chief Executive Officer, AUSTRAC — August 2026

Reporting on the referrals has varied. The Adviser has put them at around 200 brokers, accountants, solicitors and other professionals referred to law enforcement and regulators; the Australian Financial Review’s coverage described the referrals as “hundreds”. Either way, the consistent feature of the reporting is that brokers were one of several professions in the referral pool, alongside accountants and solicitors — not the whole of it.

On scale, the AFR has reported at least $4 billion of suspected exposure across the five largest banks, following CBA’s self-report of around $1 billion in February. These are reported figures rather than regulator-published totals, and brokers quoting them in client or referrer conversations should attribute them accordingly.

A note on language. A referral to law enforcement is not a charge, and a charge is not a finding. Operation Claw referrals, suspicious matter reports and a bank’s internal fraud review all identify files worth examining. None of them establishes that a named broker did anything wrong. That distinction matters when you are discussing this with a client, a referrer or a staff member.

The number people reach for

When this argument runs, someone usually produces the UBS survey finding that 44 per cent of broker-assisted applications were inaccurate against 29 per cent for direct bank applications. It is worth knowing where that number comes from before you are asked to answer it: as the ABC noted in its Operation Claw coverage, it is a 2021 survey, and it is separate from Operation Claw entirely.

A five-year-old self-reported survey, conducted before the current verification stack and before the Best Interests Duty had bedded down, is not a measurement of the channel in 2026. It is also, notably, the only channel-rate comparison anyone cites — which tells you how thin the public evidence base actually is on either side of this argument.

Why the timing matters

Parliamentary testimony by itself changes nothing on a broker’s desk. What changes things is that this testimony lands weeks before a regulator starts looking at exactly this question.

In its supervisory letter to the banking sector published on 30 September 2026 (26-232MR), ASIC set out its 2026–27 priorities. Under the heading “Lending practices and broker oversight (Expected commencement: Q3 2026–27)”, the letter says the work:

“…is likely to focus on the impact of the short-term variable remuneration changes for proprietary lenders introduced by banks in 2024, the use of referrers by lenders, and lender oversight of brokers.”

ASIC supervisory letter to the banking sector, 26-232MR, 30 September 2026

Read who that review is pointed at. It is a review of lenders — their proprietary incentive structures, their referrer arrangements, and how they oversee broker-originated lending. Reporting on the letter by Broker Daily in October described that third limb as covering broker accreditation and re-accreditation, application quality, fraud indicators, customer outcomes and remuneration.

The mechanism to understand: ASIC is not proposing a new obligation on brokers here. It is proposing to examine how well lenders supervise brokers. A bank that expects to be examined on the quality of its broker oversight will improve that oversight before the examination — and the broker experiences that as tighter verification, not as a new rule.

How this lands on your desk

Brokers have already been describing the early version of this. In Broker Daily’s October coverage of the ASIC review, Aussie broker Kit Johnson said he had seen more scrutiny of broker-channel applications and more requests for written clarification, and argued that lenders treat the broker and proprietary channels inconsistently.

Bernard Desmond, founder and director of Blank Financial, put the principle plainly in the same piece: “Consumer protection shouldn’t depend on which door the customer walks through.” Matt Turner of GSC Finance called for a zero-tolerance policy applied to both proprietary and broker channels with a reasonableness test, and Peter Liu, co-founder of AutoCalc, asked for clear accreditation criteria, practical verification guidance and timely feedback, with monitoring that is evidence-based and proportionate to risk.

Those are fair asks. None of them will be resolved before your next five files are assessed. So the question worth your time this week is narrower: what will a tightened lender oversight function look for when it opens one of your applications?

Provenance, not possession

Here is the shift, and it is a small one conceptually with real consequences in practice.

Most broker files are built to prove possession: the payslip is on file, the bank statement is on file, the ID has been verified, the preliminary assessment is complete. That satisfies the responsible lending framework under the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009, and it satisfies ASIC’s Best Interests Duty guidance on the recommendation itself.

What it does not do is answer the question a fraud reviewer asks, which is about provenance: where did this document come from, who handed it over, through what channel, and what did the broker do when something on it did not reconcile?

Matos’s own evidence is the argument for this. If a bank reviewing its own book often cannot tell whether the broker, the customer or a third party falsified a document, then the broker who can show exactly how each document reached them, and what they checked, is the broker who is not in the ambiguous pile. The file that records provenance answers the question before it is asked. The file that records only possession leaves the reviewer to guess — and an unanswered question about a document is precisely how a clean broker ends up inside someone’s review population.

This is not a new legal obligation. Nothing in the hearings or in ASIC’s supervisory letter creates one, and brokers should confirm their own requirements with their licensee or aggregator compliance team rather than reading a new duty into a bank CEO’s evidence. It is a file-construction habit that costs a few minutes per application and materially changes how your file reads to someone looking for anomalies.

The three provenance questions

For each income and identity document on a file, a provenance note answers three things in a line or two:

The provenance note

  1. Source. Who provided this, and through what channel? “Payslips uploaded by applicant via portal, 4 Nov” reads differently from “payslips emailed by referrer” — and the second is not a problem, provided it is recorded.
  2. Check. What did you do with it? Cross-check against the salary credit in the statements, the employer’s ABN, the super contributions, the YTD arithmetic. Name the check, not just the conclusion.
  3. Anomaly and resolution. If something did not reconcile, say what it was and how it was resolved. An unexplained discrepancy that you identified and chased is evidence of diligence. The same discrepancy sitting silently on the file is evidence of nothing.

On referrers specifically, the FBAA’s position has been consistent since the middle of the year. Chief executive Leo Gagic said brokers “must all carry out strong due diligence when accepting loans referred by third parties” and should know those referrers “extremely well”, questioning the source and motives behind any application that does not add up, and declining it if unsure. Given that both ASIC’s review and AUSTRAC’s referral pool touch referral pathways, a documented referrer register and a short note on how each referral relationship was assessed is the cheapest protection available right now.

The MFAA’s guidance from June runs in the same direction. Naveen Ahluwalia, the association’s executive of policy, pointed brokers to maintaining complete and accurate records, keeping detailed file notes throughout the application, explaining documentation requirements to clients and explaining the safeguards — the Best Interests Duty and responsible lending obligations — that shape the advice.

What to review this week

Broker action checklist

  1. Pull your three most recent settled files and ask of each income document: could someone reading this file in twelve months tell me where it came from? If not, your template needs a provenance field, not more documents.
  2. Add a source line to your document checklist. One field per document: who supplied it, when, and by what channel. It is a template change, not a process change.
  3. Write down your reconciliation step. Most brokers already cross-check payslips against salary credits. Few record that they did. Recording it converts a habit into evidence.
  4. Review your referrer register. Who is currently sending you business, what do you actually know about them, and when did you last check? If a referrer relationship would be hard to explain to your aggregator, deal with it before someone asks.
  5. Check your accreditation exposure. If lenders tighten oversight, accreditation and re-accreditation is where it shows up first. Know which of your panel accreditations are current and which are dormant.
  6. Brief your support staff. If a processor collects documents, they are the provenance record. They need to know what to write down.
  7. Agree your client line. Clients read bank-CEO headlines too. A calm, accurate answer — what was said, what it did and did not establish, and what your process does — is better than a defensive one.
  8. Confirm the obligations with your licensee. Nothing here replaces your aggregator or licensee compliance guidance on NCCP and Best Interests Duty requirements. Ask them what, if anything, they are changing in response.

Key takeaways

  • ANZ chief executive Nuno Matos told the House Economics Committee on 12 November that “the majority of fraud was coming from broker channels”, while also saying ANZ often could not determine whether the broker, the customer or a third party falsified the documents.
  • Brokers originated 71 per cent of ANZ’s new home loans in FY26, so a majority share of anything measured by application volume is the expected result — it is not a rate comparison between channels.
  • Westpac’s Anthony Miller described fraud as “a bit more sophisticated now with the brokers” and wants direct ATO data access as a “golden source of truth” for income verification.
  • AUSTRAC’s public statements on Operation Claw addressed lenders as a whole, with CEO Brendan Thomas saying the most effective way to stop mortgage fraud is before a loan is approved.
  • ASIC’s 30 September supervisory letter puts “lending practices and broker oversight” at Q3 2026–27 — a review of how lenders supervise brokers, which brokers will experience as tighter verification rather than as a new obligation.
  • The practical response is file provenance: record where each document came from, what you checked, and how any anomaly was resolved.

Frequently asked

Does the ANZ evidence mean brokers commit more fraud than bank staff?

No such finding has been published. Matos said most cases involved external agents and that there were two cases with an internal connection, but he also said ANZ often could not determine who falsified the documents. A statement about which channel an application arrived through is not a rate comparison between channels, and no public dataset currently supports one.

Is ASIC about to impose new obligations on brokers?

Nothing in the 30 September supervisory letter does that. The letter describes work expected to commence in Q3 2026–27 focused on proprietary remuneration changes, lenders’ use of referrers, and lender oversight of brokers. It is directed at lenders. Brokers should confirm their own obligations with their licensee or aggregator compliance team rather than inferring new duties from the letter or from the hearings.

What is the single highest-value change to make this week?

Adding a source field to your document checklist. Recording who supplied each document, when, and through what channel takes a minute per file and is the difference between a file that answers a fraud reviewer’s question and one that leaves it open.

How should I answer a client who has seen the headlines?

Accurately and without defensiveness. Two bank chief executives gave evidence about where fraud entered their systems; neither published a finding about broker conduct rates. Then describe your own process — what you verify, how you record it, and the Best Interests Duty and responsible lending obligations you work under. The MFAA has made the same point: clients value transparency about the safeguards behind the process.

Would ATO data access remove the problem?

It would shift income verification from a document that can be forged to a record that cannot be, which is why Westpac is asking for it. It would not cover identity, employment status, liabilities or business activity, and the access model, consent framework and which parties would receive the data are all unresolved. Treat it as something to watch, not something to plan around.

The bottom line

Brokers are entitled to be irritated by a week in which the channel that writes most of the country’s mortgages was described, in a parliamentary hearing room, as the place fraud comes from — by executives whose own evidence said they frequently could not identify who committed it. Irritation is reasonable. It is also not a strategy.

The more useful read is this. The statements themselves carry no legal weight. The ASIC review they sit alongside is pointed at lenders, not at you. But the predictable behaviour of a bank that expects to be assessed on its broker oversight is to oversee brokers more closely, starting now. That pressure arrives as verification requests, accreditation reviews and questions about where a document came from.

Brokers who can answer that last question from the file, in one line, will find the next twelve months considerably less uncomfortable than brokers who cannot. The documents were never the evidence. What you did with them is.

Sources

  • House of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics, Review of Australia’s four major banks — hearings 12 and 13 November 2026, Parliament House, Canberra (committee media release).
  • “Matos claims ‘majority’ of mortgage fraud stems from broker channel”, The Adviser, 13 November 2026.
  • “Westpac CEO says mortgage fraud more ‘sophisticated’ due to brokers”, The Adviser, 16 November 2026.
  • “Mortgages ‘not at the centre’ for ANZ, as brokers still dominate book”, MPA, 9 November 2026 (ANZ FY26 channel mix).
  • ASIC supervisory letter to the banking sector, 26-232MR, published 30 September 2026.
  • “Brokers call for ‘level playing field’ as ASIC probes lender oversight”, Broker Daily, 1 October 2026.
  • “‘Coordinated mortgage fraud’ uncovered as AUSTRAC puts banks on notice over ‘liar loans’”, ABC News, 19 August 2026.
  • “AUSTRAC refers hundreds over alleged mortgage fraud”, MPA reporting the Australian Financial Review, August 2026.
  • “Associations set out playbook for brokers amid fraud storm”, The Adviser, 30 June 2026 (MFAA and FBAA guidance).

Breaking news for modern brokers

Regulatory shifts, lender policy and market data — read for the broker channel, twice a day.

More at The Broker Times →

Interactive — 2 minutes

File Provenance Self-Check

Eight questions about how your files record where documents came from. Tick what is true of your current process, not what you intend to do.

Source — where it came from


Check — what you verified



Anomaly — what didn’t reconcile

Referrers and people


0/8

Start ticking to see where you sit

This is a self-assessment prompt, not a compliance test. It reflects the file-construction habits discussed in this article — it does not measure compliance with any regulatory obligation.


Nothing you tick is stored, sent or saved anywhere. This tool is general information only and is not legal or compliance advice — confirm your actual obligations with your licensee or aggregator compliance team.

More broker-first analysis of regulation, lender policy and market data.

Read The Broker Times →

Disclaimer: This article is for general information and professional development purposes only. It does not constitute legal, compliance, or financial advice. Brokers should consult their aggregator’s compliance team and, where required, seek independent legal advice regarding their obligations under the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 and ASIC’s responsible lending guidelines.